The Development of Theory of Mind in Infants

Introduction

The essay critiques the psychology of the mind as observed from the perspective of the development of the child’s mind. This is done based on an investigation by Kristine H. Onishi and Renee Baillargeon on whether 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs. Though this was not a new motivation for the research, it opened new avenues for understanding the development of the mind in infants as well as animals. The theory was found to hold when the test was conducted on the subjects. Astington and Edward (2015) defined “Theory of mind” as relating “ to our understanding of people as mental beings, each with his or her mental states – such as thoughts, wants, motives and feelings”. Theory of mind is now well developed and such findings are plausible given numerous conclusions that have been made regarding the state and ability of childhood minds such as social cognition and ability to identify their needs and those of other people. This essay analyses the findings in this article and presents findings about findings from others.

Summary

The theory of the mind is now well developed though as the findings suggest, there are grey areas that still need more work. In the paper, Onishi and Baillargeon hold the view that 15-month-old infants can hold false beliefs. To reinforce their claim, the two carried out an empirical experiment that sought to examine the ability of the infant to “predict an actor’s behavior based on other true or false beliefs about a toy’s hiding place”. All tests turn out to be significant on the view that children, from an early age, have the mental ability to hold on to several cognitive aspects such as beliefs, perceptions, and goals. Theories such as representation of the mind are used to explain this observation where they conclude that from an early age, children have this capacity. However, it is not clear when and how this capacity is developed. One of the suggestions on this was repeated observations that guide them. Given this realization, the authors suggested that such findings could be extended to other fields such as studies in the detection of autism, understanding the mental ability of animals, and using findings to help in the brain development of young people.

Critique/ evaluation 

The goal of the study is determined from the outset on the source of the ability to hold false beliefs. This interest motivated studies that go into when it starts and how well-developed it is for young people. Infants as young as 15 months were used in this and true to their expectations, this study was found to be already well-developed. The findings, in general support the belief that social cognition is one of the hallmarks of mental development that differentiates them from animals. The paper is well structured and keeps to the aim that it aims to achieve. The representational theory of the mind is used to provide a foundation. In this case, the theory is well buttressed through the findings and widely researched review of literature. 

The major finding of the report was that children as early as 15 months already can hold false beliefs. This finding was supported by Baillargeon et al. (2010) who observed that indeed, this ability develops much earlier. While the belief is that this cognitive development starts at an early age, other researchers such as Southgate et al. (2010) note that such findings cannot be conclusive. They, however, support the fact that it does not start until the age of four when they can reason with their mental state.

While supporting this claim, the authors noted that others found out that false beliefs start at an early age, as young as 10 months. Luo (2011) did a similar experiment and concluded at that tender age, they were able to interpret the choice of toys based on their true or false beliefs about which toys were present. It means that mental state is much developed at an early age and like adults they can make inferences depending on their situation. These findings supported the authors’ empirical findings, like others also did as they quoted. 

Noting that false beliefs developed probably due to repeated exposure to others’ actions, Onishi and Baillargeon seemed not to be concerned so much about how this developed. This was the leading question a the start of the paper, where they sought to find out the origins of this ability. Heyes (2014) provided an alternative opinion where two options of imaginal novelty and perceptual novelty were suggested. Besides, to minimize errors in results, two procedures of inanimate control procedures, and self-informed belief induction were suggested. This is not to disparage methods that were used but to offer alternative procedures that result in a much clearer understanding. However, Heyes (2014) differed in conclusion and noted that infants did not have that ability like adults did as the paper had suggested. This might have resulted from the methods that were used in the experiment. This is plausible as the mind develops with age. Adults should be advanced and the two failed to answer the main conclusively on the reason why this social cognitive ability starts at this age. 

The time that the infants looked at some of the images as they processed decisions on objects that were presented. The same was observed on monkeys in a research by Martin and Santos who observed that this was because it violated their beliefs. This inferred the conclusion that animals too have false beliefs that are comparable to infants. 

Conclusion 

There is much that still needs to be researched to understand how young minds think and how their development can be enhanced. There are differences on when this starts but they generally agreed that it starts at a very early age. The method used was also not conclusive with alternative options given. Given this understanding needs to be done to understand how this is developed and how this can be used to help learners, train animals, and understand learning and and socializing abnormalities such as autism.  

References

Astington, J. W. & Edward, M. J., 2015. The Development of Theory of Mind in Early Childhood*.

Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M. & He, Z., 2010. False-belief understanding in infants. Trends Cogn Sci., 14(3), pp. 110-118.

Heyes, C., 2014. False belief in infancy: a fresh look. Wiley, 17(5), p. 647–659.

Luo, Y., 2011. Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs? Cognition, 121(3), pp. 289-298.

Southgate, V., Chevallier, C. & Csibra, G., 2010. Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’ referential communication. Developmental Science, 13(6), p. 907–912.